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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) estimated that 20.3 million people in the United States
suffered from a substance use disorder (“SUD”).1  Of those people,
18.9 million did not receive treatment.2  According to individuals
with SUD, a major barrier to treatment is the inability to pay for
treatment services.3  While 34 percent of those surveyed reported
lack of health insurance as a major contributing factor to their in-
ability to pay, 8 percent were insured but reported that their insur-
ance coverage did not cover SUD treatment.4  Addressing the
inability to pay for treatment is key to increasing access to treat-
ment and decreasing the number of drug overdoses plaguing our
nation.
The types of policy proposals available to provide funding for
healthcare services, like SUD treatment, vary depending on the
structure of the nation’s healthcare system.5  In the United States,
healthcare services are largely provided by private actors, and these
services are funded through a mixture of private health insurance
1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., HHS PUBLICATION NO. PEP 19-5068, KEY SUB-
STANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS
FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH?2 (2019),  https://
bit.ly/2SDx4ju [https://perma.cc/78C4-T26M].
2. Id. at 54.
3. Id.; see also WILLIAM L WHITE, SLAYING THE DRAGON: THE HISTORY OF
ADDICTION TREATMENT AND RECOVERY IN AMERICA 432 (2d ed. 1998) (summa-
rizing additional barriers to access).
4. Id. at 432.
5. Healthcare systems are typically classified into four types: (1) the Bever-
idge Model, (2) the Bismarck Model, (3) the National Health Insurance Model,
and (4) the Out-of-Pocket Model.  In the Beveridge Model, the government pro-
vides and finances health care through taxing.  The Bismarck Model insurers are
usually financed by employers and employees through payroll deductions and
must cover everyone which allows for little to no profit for the insurers.  The Na-
tional Health Insurance Model is made of up payments by all citizens to a publicly
run insurance company that then pays for private sector providers.  The Out-Of-
Pocket Model is known as the “pay-to-play” model, where only those with money
are able to pay for health care while the poor stay sick or die.  Mimi Chung, Health
Care Reform: Learning from Other Major Health Care Systems, PRINCETON PUB.
HEALTH REV. (Dec. 2, 2017), https://bit.ly/2PgBLye [https://perma.cc/SPM2-
Y2A2].  The United States has a private healthcare system, financed by private
health insurance or public health insurance.  Public health insurance is provided
only to eligible persons that fall within statutorily defined categories, which can
differ by state.  While the majority of the public in the United States receives care
from private providers, military personnel and military veterans receive govern-
ment provided health care through the veterans’ administration. Id.
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and out-of-pocket expenses, with public health insurance programs
covering only 35.9 percent of the population.6
For much of history, U.S. private insurers have not covered
SUD treatment on par with physical health benefits, and federal
guidelines did not require major public health insurance programs,
like Medicaid,7 to cover these services.8  Prior to the 1980s, private
insurers often excluded SUD treatment from coverage altogether.
During the 1980s, there was a move by private insurers to cover
SUD treatment more generously,9 but such coverage soon gave way
6. Sixty-seven percent of Americans are enrolled in private health insurance.
The U.S. Health Care System, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, https://bit.ly/
2wEAVEU [https://perma.cc/QM7S-LAQR] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).  Public in-
surance comes in three forms: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health In-
surance Program (“CHIP”).  Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal and state
governments but is administered by the state.  Richard Frank & Thomas McGuire,
Health Care Financing Reform and State Mental Health Systems, in HEALTH, POL-
ICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES, 138–39 (Robert F. Rich & Wil-
liam D. White eds., 1996).  Eligibility for Medicaid differs by state and is tied to
income. Medicare vs. Medicaid: What’s the Difference?, BENEFITS.GOV (Nov. 24,
2019), https://bit.ly/2A8BI2N [https://perma.cc/2VCK-QBCK].  Medicare, on the
other hand, is an entitlement program through which all Americans can qualify by
paying wage taxes and reaching the statutory age.  Applicants can also qualify for
Medicare if they have a qualifying disability.  Juliette Cubanski et al., A Primer on
Medicare: Key Facts About the Medicare Program and the People it Covers, KFF
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://bit.ly/2W8x3Gi [https://perma.cc/RUJ2-5AWQ].  Medicare
is administered by the federal government. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
(HHS), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://bit.ly/3cb6VAp [https://perma.cc/T53Z-SRY4]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020).  However, the federal government has delegated servic-
ing of the plans to private insurers. Health Insurance Exchanges Under the Afford-
able Care Act: Governance Options and Issues, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’Rs 1,
2–3 (2011), https://bit.ly/2V9R9QF [https://perma.cc/FK7G-W62V].  Under the Af-
fordable Care Act (“ACA”), CHIP has been folded into Medicaid.  CHIP, which is
administered by the states and jointly funded by the states and the federal govern-
ment, provides health insurance to children from families with low-incomes.
Robin Rudowitz et al., Children’s Health Coverage: Medicaid, CHIP, and the ACA,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 26, 2014), https://bit.ly/2wwjCpl [https://perma.cc/
7GDE-6484].
7. See Who is Eligible for Medicaid?, HHS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2yywblw [https:/
/perma.cc/C6F9-M5CL] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). for an explanation of who qual-
ifies for Medicaid. See also Frank & McGuire, supra note 6, at 137–40 (discussing
how mental health benefits have been financed historically and stating that mental
health benefits were often optional benefits that states could elect to include, but
were not mandated to include); A. Thomas McLellan & Kathleen Meyers, Con-
temporary Addiction Treatment: A Review of Systems Problems for Adults and Ad-
olescents, 56 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 764, 768 (2004).
8. Amanda J. Abraham et al., The Affordable Care Act Transformation of
Substance Use Disorder Treatment, 107 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1, 31–32 (2017).
9. According to White, in the 1980s, employers began to realize that coverage
of SUD treatment may increase worker productivity and therefore adjusted their
insurance policies to include SUD treatment. See id. at 395–400.  Employers’ will-
ingness to cover SUD treatment was supported by the recent program accredita-
tion and credentialing of alcohol use disorder treatment. Id. 382–84.
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to requirements for pre-approval, “failed first,” maximum annual or
lifetime benefits, and other restrictions.10  While some states en-
acted legislation to improve private insurance coverage of SUD
treatment, states did so in varying degrees.11  Policy entrepreneurs12
pushed for federal legislation because of states’ failures to consist-
ently require private insurers to cover SUD benefits at parity, or
equal to, physical health benefits and because federal legislation
preempted state regulation over some employer-sponsored health
plans.13  It took legislators decades to incrementally enact federal
legislation, which required some insurers to cover SUD treatment
benefits at parity with physical health benefits (“federal parity legis-
lation”); but in doing so, federal legislators encroached upon an
area that has traditionally fallen to the states to regulate.14  Further
complicating matters, the federal agencies tasked with enforcing
federal parity legislation delegated this authority to the states.15
Some states explicitly refused to enforce federal parity provisions,
arguing it was not the responsibility of state insurance commission-
10. Unfortunately, with the increase in insurers willing to pay for treatment,
SUD treatment facilities grew in great number, and there was little oversight and
regulation of these facilities—leading to a great disparity between the quality of
services provided. See White, supra note 3, at 396–98.  Further, the cost of such
treatment grew. Id.  Insurers reported that they were uncertain about how to
gauge the medical necessity of some of these treatments and how to combat the
corruption growing in some of the addiction treatment facilities. Id. at 398–99.  To
combat these escalating costs, most insurers created utilization review teams and
managed care program oversight; some started requiring pre-approval for sub-
stance use treatment. Id. at 400–01.  The managed care programs of the 1990s
were largely seen as a financial backlash to the excesses of 1980s. Id. at 399.  The
primary responsibility of the utilization review teams was to determine whether or
not the requested treatment with “medically necessary.” Id.  But due to the lack of
professional guidelines at the time, the process was extremely subjective and re-
sulted in unnecessary denials of care. Id.  Treatment limits that limited the number
of days or the type of treatment became more commonplace. Id.  SUD treatment
often had separate cost sharing, deductibles, or limits, including treatment day or
visit limits. Id.  These limitations existed despite the lack of their existence for
chronic medical physical disorders diseases and were often more stringent and bur-
densome for SUD treatment than for physical health benefits. Id.
11. See, e.g., McLellan & Meyers, supra note 7, at 768.
12. “Policy entrepreneurs are energetic actors who engage in collaborative ef-
forts in and around government to promote policy innovations.”  Michael Min-
trom, So You Want to be a Policy Entrepreneur?, 2 POL’Y DESIGN AND PRAC. 1, 1
(2019).
13. See infra Section III for a discussion of preemption.  The federal Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”) provided parity
protections to 113 million people, many of whom were excluded from state law
protections.  Margo L. Rosenbach et al., Implementation of Mental Health Parity:
Lessons from California, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1589, 1589 (2009).
14. This statement is expounded upon in Section III.
15. This statement is expounded up on Section III.
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ers to enforce federal laws16 and in doing so showed the degree to
which federalism would affect the implementation and enforcement
of federal parity laws.
Federal parity laws and their state equivalents (“parity laws”)
have increased access to SUD treatment by decreasing the cost
borne by the insured, while only marginally increasing health plan
costs.17  Despite these improvements, the effects of parity on access
to SUD treatment have been lower than expected.  Recent reports
suggest that states differ in the degree to which they enforcement
parity laws,18 which may explain why persons surveyed still report
having inadequate insurance coverage for SUD treatment despite
the enactment of parity laws.  While other articles have offered sug-
gestions for improving parity, most have lumped mental health and
SUD treatment coverage together in their analysis and recommen-
dations.  This Article focuses exclusively on SUD treatment and its
distinct institutional history.
In addition to its focus on SUD treatment, this Article contrib-
utes to the literature by analyzing parity implementation through
the lens of federalism.  In doing so, it demonstrates that the division
of federal and state responsibilities has contributed to failures in
implementation and enforcement.  Further, this Article argues that
parity implementation efforts must account for the current ideologi-
cal divide that has characterized intergovernmental relationships.19
In doing so, this Article suggests alternate structures for dividing
the responsibilities for enforcement.
16. Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, and Missouri have refused to enforce federal
parity laws. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY
ACT OF 2008 ENFORCEMENT REPORT 1 (2018), https://go.cms.gov/2HMHrvz
[https://perma.cc/34YW-A32F].
17. Rosenbach et al., supra note 13, at 1590; see, e.g., Dhaval Dave & Swati
Mukerjee, Mental Health Parity Legislation, Cost-sharing, and Substance-abuse
Treatment Admissions, 20 HEALTH ECON. 161, 161 (2011).  Note: studies that re-
port mixed results in the increases to access due to parity include measurements
for access to both SUD and mental health treatments.  When SUD treatment ac-
cess is analyzed separately, the results demonstrate that parity has indeed im-
proved access. See also Hefei Wen et al., State Parity Laws and Access to
Treatment for Substance Use Disorder in the United States: Implications for Federal
Parity Legislation, 70 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH 6 (2013), https://bit.ly/2SoaFa8
[https://perma.cc/2BWF-YKJT].
18. The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 10th Anniversary,
PARITYTRACK, https://bit.ly/3cd73iL [https://perma.cc/W7CD-MG7B] (last visited
May 5, 2020).
19. Intergovernmental relations refers to the collaboration between levels of
governments in a federal system to implement public policies.  Philip Rocco, Mak-
ing Federalism Work? The Politics of Intergovernmental Collaboration and the
PPACA, 37 J. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. 412, 415 (2015).
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I divided this Article into three parts.  In Section I, I review
theories of federalism from the social sciences literature and pro-
vide commentary on their usefulness in studying the state imple-
mentation of federal law in the context of parity.  I focus my
analysis on social science theories of federalism because unlike
much of the legal scholarship on federalism, which focuses on the
constitutional basis for divisions of responsibilities between govern-
ments, the social sciences scholarship focuses on the optimal struc-
turing of intergovernmental relationships to achieve more effective
implementation and enforcement of the law.
In Section II, I provide a contextual overview of the division of
powers of insurance regulation.  I support my conclusions with con-
tent and legal analysis of federal legislation, rules, cases, and admin-
istrative guidance on parity.20  In Section III, I demonstrate how
federalism continues to present opportunities and barriers to imple-
mentation and enforcement by providing the results of my empiri-
cal analysis21  of state attempts to enforce federal parity laws.
I. THEORIES OF FEDERALISM IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
This Section is by no means intended to be a complete litera-
ture review of the existing theories of federalism.  Rather, this Sec-
tion provides the reader with an overview of the most relevant
theories of federalism, as well as developments in recent theories
that address current partisan politics.  The order in which the theo-
ries of federalism is presented does not reflect the order in which
these theories developed in the literature.22  The theories of feder-
20. My corpus of documents included a snowball sample of documents from
the Executive branch, including the Departments of Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Treasury, the National Institute on Mental Health and the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Agency, as well as congressional hearing notes.  I also
reviewed a selection of publications by advocacy organizations, such as the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, the National Alliance of Mental Illness,
the Kaiser Family Foundation, and articles from news media outlets.
21. A subset of my analysis was an empirical content analysis of 112 state
government documents, including administrative guidance, statutes, and regula-
tions which populated when using the search terms “Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act” in WestlawNext searching all states.  Of these documents,
42 were implementing or enforcing documents.  I defined an implementing docu-
ment as one which simply implemented the MHPAEA.  Most of the implementing
documents stated that insurers must comply with MHPAEA and effectively allo-
cated power to their state administrative agency to enforce MHPAEA.  Enforce-
ment documents created mechanisms to ensure compliance with MHPAEA.  Such
documents may include penalties, review processes, or filing requirements.
22. In fact, competitive federalism is said to have emerged in response to co-
operative federalism, after theories of cooperative federalism were said to shift
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alism have been presented this way to allow for the best transition
between concepts relevant to this Article.  Throughout my review
of the theoretical literature, I explain the theories’ particular rele-
vance for parity implementation and enforcement.
In contemporary scholarship, American federalism is defined
as the division of powers between the federal and state govern-
ments.23  Federalism involves the allocation of policymaking, the
administration of policies, and the financing for these policies.24  In
determining which level of government should be tasked with ad-
ministering or enforcing legislation, the issues that arise are typi-
cally centered around capacity and the appropriate role, or scope,
of government.25
II. THEORIES OF FEDERALISM
A. Dual Federalism
Many students of the law are familiar with the concept of dual
federalism.  Dual federalism suggests that federal, state, and local
governments should operate within completely separate spheres of
governance, with little to no overlap.26  The U.S. Constitution is in-
terpreted as allocating specific and enumerated powers to the fed-
eral government while reserving the remaining powers to the states
and the people.27  However, the Supreme Court’s “liberal” inter-
pretation of the federal government’s power to regulate “interstate
commerce” from the 1960s until the early 1990s expanded the fed-
eral government’s power to domestic areas traditionally regulated
by the states.28
power from the state to federal government.  Robert Agranoff, Managing within
the Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental Relations Exist?, 31 PUBLIUS 31, 43
(2017) (noting that cooperative federalism arose between dual federalism and co-
ercive federalism, which then elicited calls for decentralization of powers).
23. See, e.g., Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: Neither a Na-
tional nor a Federal Constitution, but a Composition of Both, 86 YALE L.J. 1273,
1273 (1976).
24. Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Health Care Policy and the American
States: Issues of Federalism, in HEALTH, POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERI-
CAN STATES, supra note 6, at 10 [hereinafter Issues of Federalism].
25. Id. at 11.
26. See Kristen H. Engel, EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Emerging New Coop-
erative Federalism?, 45 PUBLIUS 452, 461 (2015) [hereinafter Engel, New Coopera-
tive Federalism].
27. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
28. For a short history of federal expansion into health insurance regulation,
see generally Michael S. Sparer et al., Inching Toward Incrementalism: Federalism,
Devolution, and Health Policy in the United States and the United Kingdom, 36 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 33 (2011).
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Scholar Martin Grodzins argues, however, that the theory of
dual federalism does not accurately characterize the division of
powers in the American system of governance.29  He likens dual
federalism to a layer cake with each level of government function-
ing as a layer of the cake.  Each layer is distinctly separate, repre-
senting a clear division between federal and state responsibilities.30
The American system of government, he argues, is more like a mar-
ble cake, with the swirls of chocolate and vanilla cake representing
the concurrent and shared jurisdiction over many policy domains by
the federal, state, and local governments.31  As will be discussed in-
fra, health insurance regulation is a policy domain that is best ex-
plained by using both the layer and marble cake analogies; federal
legislative reforms in the 1960s created exclusive federal jurisdiction
over some employer-sponsored health care plans (the layer cake)
and shared jurisdiction over other plans (the marble cake).  If dual
federalism is akin to a layer cake, competitive and cooperative fed-
eralism theory (reviewed below) can be described as a marble
cake.32
B. Competitive Federalism
Competitive federalism is based on economic theories of mar-
kets33 and suggests that competition between the state governments
results in the development of the most effective and cost efficient
policies.34  Many argue this theory best allows states to act as labo-
ratories of democracy.35  The theory suggests that the federal gov-
29. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOV-
ERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (Transaction Publishers, 1966).
30. See id.
31. See id.; see also Gwen Arnold, When Cooperative Federalism Isn’t: How
U.S. Federal Interagency Contradictions Impede Effective Wetland Management, 45
PUBLIUS 244, 245 (2015) (noting that U.S. federal and state governments often
pursue policies within the same sphere).
32. See Craig Volden, Intergovernmental Political Competition in American
Federalism, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 328 (2005).
33. See Richard A. Musgrave, Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition, 11
J. ECON. PERSPECT. 65, 66–67 (1997).  Musgrave also discusses the problems with
applying this market and product analogy to the structuring of intergovernmental
relationships. See id.
34. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 422 (1956).
35. See, e.g., Robyn Hollander & Haig Patapany, Morality Policy and Federal-
ism: Innovation, Diffusion, and Limits, 47 PUBLIUS 1 (2017) (demonstrating that in
certain circumstances, devolution of powers from the federal government to the
states can increase state’s innovation and experimentation); see also Virginia Gray,
Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174, 1174
(1973) (showing that devolution can result in state policy experimentation, with
successful policies being later adopted by neighboring states).
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ernment should allow lower levels of governments, like states and
localities, to experiment with various policy ideas.36  Both horizon-
tal and vertical levels of government can then learn from successful
states and avoid the cost incurred from enacting ineffective poli-
cies.37  States can monitor the failures and successes of these policy
experiments, and theoretically, successful policies will spread to
neighboring states and then across the country, in —a process often
referred to horizontal diffusion.38  Further, a bottom-up or vertical
diffusion can occur with successful policies at the state level being
later adopted at the federal level.39
An example of vertical diffusion, or bottom-up policy learning,
can be seen in the role that Massachusetts policy innovation played
in the drafting of the Federal Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”).40  The three-legged-stool on which the ACA
rests includes an employer mandate, expanded Medicaid, and subsi-
dies for individuals purchasing insurance; each of these building
blocks is patterned after the Massachusetts experiment with health-
care access reform.41  In 1988, Massachusetts implemented a “pay
or play” employer mandate that required employers to provide
health insurance to their employees or pay a fine per employee.42
In 1996 and 1997, Massachusetts expanded its Medicaid program in
an effort to provide more universal coverage.43  In 2006, Massachu-
setts had its third wave of healthcare access reform, which included
offering individuals subsidies for purchasing health insurance and
creating health insurance exchanges where individuals could
purchase the insurance.44  Massachusetts’ experimentation with
36. See supra note 35.
37. See J. Mitchell Pickerill & Paul Chen, Medical Marijuana Policy and the
Virtues of Federalism, 38 PUBLIUS 22, 24–25 (2008) (explaining how federalism can
allow costs of policy innovation to be born only by the state innovating).
38. See Hollander and Patapany, supra note 35, at 14; see also Scott Burris et
al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public Health: The Case
of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1147 (2008); Craig
Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s Health
Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL, SCI, 294, 295 (2006) [hereinafter Volden, Policy
Laboratories].
39. Hollander & Parapany, supra note 35 at 1; see also Burris et al., supra note
38 at 1147; see generally Volden, Policy Laboratories, supra note 38.
40. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
41. JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 104–20
(Univ. of California Press, 1st ed. 2011).
42. This requirement applied to employers with six or more employees. See
John E. McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access
Reform, 25 HEALTH AFF. W420, w421 (2006).
43. See id.
44. Id. at w421–22
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these reforms helped convince policymakers and stakeholders alike
that the Massachusetts plan provided the best blueprint for national
healthcare reform.45  In sum, at times, the federal government
cherry picks from successful state policies when deciding which pol-
icies to implement on a national scale.
Aside from allowing states to innovate, competitive federalism
permits the state and local government’s a degree of autonomy and
encourages the development of policies and laws tailored to the
needs of their particular populations.46  Federal block grants, like
those historically used to fund SUD treatment and treatment for
mental illness, can be used to allow states the opportunities to de-
velop tailored programs administered at the state level.47  This dev-
olution of federal responsibilities to the states through mechanisms
like block grants is also referred to as “fiscal federalism.”48  Propo-
nents of this approach argue that citizens and corporations can vote
with their feet and leave their states if they disagree with the types
of policies enacted.49  In actuality, however, there is conflicting evi-
dence over the degree to which voters are actually mobile and able
to exercise such forms of protest.50
Despite some of its purported benefits, there are concerns with
the degree to which competitive federalism actually encourages a
“race to the bottom.”51  Scholars like Paul Peterson and Mark Rom
argue that competitive federalism can encourage states to develop
the least generous welfare policies.52  If states offer policies that are
substantial in comparison to neighboring states, they risk attracting
a flood of “needy” residents relocating from less generous states.53
45. MCDONOUGH, supra note 41, at 54.
46. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 245; see also Agranoff, supra note 22, at 36
(arguing that states should adopt federal programs to meet their own needs and
differences).
47. See Brian K. Collins & Brian J. Gerber, Redistributive Policy and Devolu-
tion: Is State Administration a Road Block (Grant) to Equitable Access to Federal
Funds?, 16 J. PUB. ADM. RES. THEORY 613, 618 (2006).
48. Musgrave, supra note 33, at 66.
49. Tom Miller, A Regulatory Bypass Operation, 22 CATO J. 85, 95–96 (2002).
Cf. also Spencer H. Banzhaf & Randall P. Walsh, Do People Vote with Their Feet?
An Empirical Test of Tiebout, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 843, 862 (2008) (finding that
people do vote with their feet on environmental policy).
50. See Christopher Berry, Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal
Common-Pool, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 802, 803 (2008).
51. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Is There a “Race,” and Is It “To the Bot-
tom?”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
52. See generally Paul E. Peterson & Mark C. Rom, WELFARE MAGNETS: A
NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD (Brookings Institution Press, 1990).
53. See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV.,
783, 858–859 (2004) (explaining that states are encouraged to “race to the bottom”
with environmental policies and drug policies); see also Volden, Policy Laborato-
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Using this logic, state legislators may be deterred from enacting ro-
bust parity protections because they fear that such generous protec-
tions could attract an influx of new residents needing SUD or
mental health treatment.
Aside from encouraging states to race to the bottom, competi-
tive federalism is not optimal for the development of civil rights
policies or other policies designed to protect disadvantaged citi-
zens.54  And parity is often framed as an issue of civil rights.55
Competitive federalism encourages disparate policies and does not
create a uniform standard unless that standard is eventually
adopted by the federal government through vertical diffusion.56
Cooperative federalism arrangements (reviewed infra), where the
federal government sets minimum standards and oversees state im-
plementation, have been shown to be the most effective for the pro-
tection of such rights.57  The benefits of minimum federal standards
for state policy are many, perhaps the most important of which is
stated by Gwen Arnold:
[W]hen the federal government dictates minimum standards for
state policy, interstate businesses can be assured some degree of
consistency; damaging interstate competition can be limited; citi-
zens are guaranteed a minimum degree of equity in receipt of
legal treatment and public services; and there may be regulatory
economies of scale.58
ries, supra note 38 (summarizing the arguments made to support the “race to the
bottom” theory as applied to welfare benefits).
54. See generally, JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS,
AND CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE (Routledge,
2006); DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN
GROWTH, 1820–2000 (Knopf Doubleday Pub. Group, 2003); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY,
ET AL., AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERI-
CAN UNDERCLASS (Harv. Univ. Press, 1993); Debra A. Reid, African Americans
and Land Loss in Texas: Government Duplicity and Discrimination Based on Race
and Class, 77 AGRIC. HIST 58, 92 (2003).
55. See generally Ellen Weber, Equality Standards for Health Insurance Cov-
erage: Will the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimina-
tion?, 43 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 179 (2013).
56. See Lisa L. Miller, The Invisible Black Victim: How American Federalism
Perpetuates Racial Inequality in Criminal Justice, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 805, 807
(2010).
57. While not all scholars agree that the federal government is best equipped
to ensure civil rights protections, most agree that it is the majority view. See, e.g.,
Reid, supra note 55, which demonstrates how the federal government provided
greater protections for African American farmers than did the Texas government.
58. Arnold, supra note 31, at 245.
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Finally, the devolution of policy responsibility to the states
through the use of mechanisms like block grants can result in great
gaps between policy goals and implementation.59
Much of what has been covered thus far in this Section de-
scribes competitive federalism as competition between horizontal
governments, i.e. state vs. state, local vs. local.  However, competi-
tive federalism also applies to situations in which state, local, and
federal governments (vertical governments) have the authority to
enact policies in areas of shared jurisdiction and do so without coor-
dination.60  This lack of coordination often results in inefficiencies
and confusion by citizens over which government is the enforcer.
C. Cooperative Federalism
While competitive federalism may result in some national uni-
formity over time, cooperative federalism arrangements prioritize a
national acceptable baseline through the creation of federal mini-
mum standards.61  Cooperative federalism offers a theory for struc-
turing intergovernmental relationships in ways that encourage
coordination and cooperation between the levels of government,
decreasing inefficiencies and confusion.62  According to federalism
scholar Daniel J. Elazar, collaboration between governments within
federalism is the cornerstone of our American democracy.  This is
specifically due the U.S.’s adoption of a federalist theory of govern-
ment, a dual governmental structure, and the development of cer-
tain cooperative programs and administrative mechanisms for
collaboration.63
The benefits of the cooperative model are many, including
efficiency.
One of the notable early contributors to cooperative federal-
ism, Jane Perry Clark describes cooperative federalism in The Rise
of the New Federalism as
a means of coordinating the use of federal and state resources, of
eliminating the duplications in activity, of cutting down expenses,
of accomplishing work which could not otherwise be carried out,
59. V.O. KEY, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES
228 (1937).
60. Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 11, 32.
61. Engel, New Cooperative Federalism, supra note 26, at 461.
62. Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 11.
63. For a review of Elazar’s primary concepts, see Agranoff, supra note 22, at
31–32.  Elazar is credited with moving federalism scholarship away from thinking
solely in terms of constitutional law and instead focusing on social science ap-
proaches to federalism. Id. at 36.
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and in general of attempting to make the wheels of government
in the federal system of the United States move more smoothly
than would be otherwise possible.64
Aside from the benefits outlined by Clark, cooperative federal-
ism permits the federal government to enact social policies that
benefit the public and have widespread support but which may not
be independently adopted by states.65  For example, in states with
powerful insurance lobbies, health insurance reforms like parity
may be difficult to enact because of the political costs.  Mandatory
federal guidelines requiring parity allow state legislators to pass the
political blame onto the federal government while continuing to en-
force a policy that benefits their constituents.
As a governance structure, cooperative federalism facilitates
centralized control but still allows the federal government to de-
volve certain aspects of implementation to the states.66  Some state
officials report welcoming the help, expertise, and guidance of fed-
eral officials, in part because they often share similar career back-
grounds and training.67  Aside from furthering cooperation with
federal officials, cooperative federalism encourages states to tailor
policies to their local constituents by authorizing partial preemp-
tion—where the federal standard operates as a floor, but states are
permitted to enact stricter policies.68  The combination of state and
federal law results in dual enforcement of these laws by both fed-
eral administrative agencies and state attorneys general.69  This in-
creases the likelihood that violations of law will be investigated and
remedied.  Admittedly, this one-tail devolution created by partial
preemption tends to favor progressive states more than conserva-
tive states, as partial preemption is most likely to be used to provide
citizens with greater protections and benefits.70  However, for the
enforcement of parity laws, dual enforcement could help actualize
parity, at least in some states.  Moreover, partial preemption autho-
64. JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM: FEDERAL-STATE
COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Russel & Russel eds., 1966)
65. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 245.
66. Id. at 244.
67. Agranoff, supra note 22, at 35.
68. See Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. Posner, American Federalism in an Era
of Partisan Polarization: The Intergovernmental Paradox of Obama’s “New Na-
tionalism”, 46 PUBLIUS 281, 294, 298 (2016).
69. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Gillian E. Metzger, The President and the
States: Patterns of Contestation and Collaboration Under Obama, 46 PUBLIUS 308,
322–323 (2016).
70. See Conlan & Posner, supra note 68, at 293–94.
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rizes states to experiment with more robust parity policies while still
ensuring a federal minimum.
The benefits of a cooperative federalism model seem to out-
weigh the costs for the implementation and enforcement of policies
like parity.  There may also be structural realities that would re-
quire a cooperative arrangement.  Federalism scholar Agranoff ar-
gues that the current division of powers between the U.S. federal
and state governments has made collaboration between the govern-
ments the default.  “Collaboration,” he writes, “or at least a lack of
federal control, exists by default, so to speak, because of the very
real limits on the federal (and state) government’s ability to control
subnational officials’ actions.”71  Even if cooperative federalism is
the default as Agranoff argues, and a preliminary review of the co-
operative federalism research supports cooperation in areas like
parity where discrimination or civil rights violations are a concern,
the structure of the divisions of powers within the collaborative re-
lationship requires more careful analysis.
1. Division of Powers in Cooperative Arrangements
In determining how to allocate power and responsibilities in
cooperative relationships, some cooperative federalism scholars
have argued that federal dominance in areas of shared jurisdiction
is warranted because, historically, the federal government has been
“[o]n the whole more stable, more responsive to public needs, more
effective in administration not to speak of its greater concern for
civil liberties.”72  While states’ capacity to administer public policy
has increased,73 when broad policy goals require concentrated ac-
tion, federal dominance is preferable,74 particularly for goods like
healthcare or health insurance (which can be seen as national vs.
local goods).75  This suggests that federal dominance in the regula-
tion and implementation of parity laws may be warranted.
Federal dominance appears to be typical of current coopera-
tive governmental relationships, with the federal government in
charge of the decision-making and states expected to implement
71. Agranoff, supra note 22, at 52.
72. Id. at 41 (citing RICHARD ROSE, UNDERSTANDING BIG GOVERNMENT 4
(1984); see also Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 12. See generally Reid, supra
note 54 (outlining a policy instance in which federal action was needed in order to
ensure equity for sharecroppers in Texas).
73. See Robert Jay Dilger, The Study of American Federalism at the Turn of
the Century, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 98, 102 (2000).
74. Agranoff, supra note 22, at 41.
75. Cf. Musgrave, supra note 33, at 67.
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federal guidelines.76  Professor Michael Doonan likened the rela-
tionships between the federal and state governments in contempo-
rary cooperative arrangements to that of a junior and senior partner
in a law firm.77  While the relationship is technically a partnership,
the junior partner is often expected to carry out the wishes of the
senior partner and is not on equal footing when it comes to deci-
sion-making.78  Doonan argues that federal involvement in health-
care policy has been largely patterned on this junior/senior
partnership model.79  Extending his theory, I will demonstrate infra
how the junior/senior partnership model adequately describes inter-
governmental relationships in implementing and enforcing parity.
Doonan maintains that states should be employed as more
equal partners in the planning and designing of the implementation
process than is currently the norm in cooperative arrangements.
However, as greater state involvement increases, so does the likeli-
hood that states will try to subvert the protections of national regu-
lations, particularly if the federal policy was passed along partisan
lines.  For example, when states were tasked with implementing sec-
tions of the ACA, state level administrators intentionally used their
power of discretion to shift policies back towards the state level po-
litical majority—even when doing so undermined the protections of
the ACA.80  As was also demonstrated by state administration of
components of the ACA, state administrators can refuse to bargain
over the implementation of critical parts of the federal law.81
In sum, current research in cooperative federalism, particularly
as applied to healthcare policy, suggests that the federal govern-
ment may need the states’ assistance in implementing and enforcing
federal policies due to issues of capacity and the structure of Amer-
76. See generally MICHAEL DOONAN, AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE:
THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH POLICY
(Brookings Inst. Press, 2013). See also Agranoff, supra note 22, at 32.  It is impor-
tant to note that there has been much scholarship devoted to the idea that the
amount of federal government involvement has shrunk, particularly during and
after the Reagan presidency. See Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 16–17.
This was referred to as the “devolution revolution.”  However, the so-called “dev-
olution revolution” has been convincingly challenged by the concept of “new fed-
eralism,” which suggests that federal government involvement in social policies has
not decreased but rather changed in character.  Federal dominance in a guideline
setting has remained, but the federal government has devolved the implementation
of programs and enforcement of federal regulations to states to a greater degree.
See Cho & Wright, supra note 63, at 58; see also Dilger, supra note 73, at 102.
77. DOONAN, supra note 76, at 11.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Rocco, supra note 19, at 418.
81. Id.
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ican federalism.  Based on an analysis of healthcare policies, Profes-
sor Doonan concludes that federal dominance in decision-making is
typical in cooperative arrangements.  While cooperative federalism
relationships may be desired and necessary, issues with state buy-in
and willingness to actively implement and enforce federal policies
remain.  These same issues have indeed surfaced in the implemen-
tation and enforcement of federal parity laws.  So, how can the fed-
eral government make state cooperation more likely given these
circumstances?
2. Incentivizing States to Cooperate
If states do not agree to enforce federal policies based solely
on the shared belief in the importance of the underlying policy, the
federal government can rely on carrots (incentives) or sticks (regu-
latory penalties) to ensure the implementation and enforcement of
federal law.82
The use of carrots, or financial incentives, has been historically
popular in encouraging the states to collaborate on matters of
healthcare policy.  Penalties for failure to properly implement or
enforce federal healthcare policy have often resulted in the cur-
tailing of previously awarded federal grants-in-aid.83  However, the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius84 has placed limits on the extent to which the
federal government can place restrictions on previously awarded
federal grants to incentivize new behavior.85  Nevertheless, care-
fully tailored financial incentives and penalties can and should be
components of any cooperative arrangements to enforce federal
parity laws.  Such financial incentives and penalties must be accom-
panied by active federal oversight of states’ enforcement of federal
parity laws.
To illustrate the importance of active federal oversight in con-
junction with carrots and sticks, consider two health policy exam-
82. Arnold, supra note 31, at 245.
83. Cho & Wright, supra note 63, at 2, 4 (citing examples of such coercion
including crosscutting requirements, crossover sanctions, and preemption).
84. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) [hereinafter
NFIB v. Sebelius].
85. Id. The Court opined that “the threatened loss of funding is so large that
States have no real choice but to participate in the Medicaid expansion” and that
the federal government could not attach the penalties to the existing Medicaid
program funding because the Medicaid expansion was akin to an entirely new pro-
gram altogether and not a mere addition. Id. at 625.  In ruling this, the Court
stated that “when . . . conditions take the form of threats to terminate other signifi-
cant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressur-
ing the States to accept policy changes.” Id. at 580.
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ples of cooperative arrangements where the federal government
tried to elicit state cooperation in administering federal programs
and enforcing federal law.  In the first example, the federal govern-
ment provided the states with substantial financial incentives, pen-
alties tied to these incentives, and active program oversight
(“Example 1”).  In the second example, the federal government
provided minimal federal resources and nominal state oversight
(“Example 2”).86  Both of these examples provide useful compari-
sons to the current structure of federal parity implementation.
Admittedly, refusal of states to adopt the Medicaid expansion
under the ACA calls into question the effectiveness of financial in-
centives amidst contemporary partisan politics.  I will address the
practicalities of incentives and regulatory penalties post-ACA in
Section 3(c) and ask the readers to hold such objections in abey-
ance until then.
a. Example 1: CHIP
In 1997, the federal government created the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (“CHIP”), a program that provides health in-
surance benefits to children from families whose incomes are too
high to qualify for Medicaid.87  States administer the program ac-
cording to federal guidelines, and the federal and state governments
jointly fund the program.88  Federal grant funding for the program
is generous, ranging from 65 to 85 percent of total program costs,
depending on the states per capita income levels.89  All states have
opted to participate in the program with most states expanding the
maximum federal income limits for eligibility to up to 200 percent
of the federal poverty limit.90  States were given great autonomy in
program design and many states took the opportunity to experi-
ment;91 however, federal guidelines required federal approval for
86. DOONAN, supra note 76, at 5, 13.
87. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Program History, MEDICAID.GOV, https://bit.ly/328nXuG [https://
perma.cc/UGN9-QZKZ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
88. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Children’s Health Insurance Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://bit.ly/
3bQTBkX [https://perma.cc/PQF6-9JAT] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
89. See Volden, Policy Laboratories, supra note 38, at 296–97 (“All states
found the matching grants offered by the federal government through the CHIP
program too attractive to pass up.”).
90. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, supra note 88.  Initial eligibil-
ity levels adopted by the states ranged from 133 percent to 300 percent of the
federal poverty level. See id. at 296.
91. See Volden, supra note 38, at 296–97.
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each state amendment or change to the program.92  Thus, the gen-
erous incentives and freedom to innovate were combined with ac-
tive oversight and reporting requirements.  According to Professor
Doonan, this winning combination of carrots and sticks contributed
to CHIP’s relative success.93
b. Example 2: HIPAA
The story of HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act, is used by some federalism scholars as an example
of what can go wrong when intergovernmental relationships are
structured poorly.94  HIPAA was enacted by Congress to provide
minimum national benefit standards for health insurance while per-
mitting the states to continue their primary oversight and control
over private individual health insurance plans offered to citizens of
their state.95  Although HIPAA is commonly thought of as estab-
lishing privacy standards for health information, it contains addi-
tional health insurance reforms, including a mandate that some
employer-sponsored health plans cover pre-existing conditions.96
The true potential of HIPAA was not realized, in part, due to
states’ failures to enforce its provisions—an outcome that was not
surprising given the lack of both adequate carrots and sticks to in-
duce state performance.97  Unlike CHIP, HIPAA provided margi-
nal government resources to enforce the Act, leaving states to pay
the costs of enforcement.98  Perhaps, due in part to the absence of
conditional federal grants that could have been used as leverage,
HIPAA implementation lacked federal government oversight and
reporting requirements;99  HIPAA’s poor enforcement can be
linked to this less than optimal structuring of carrots and sticks.
92. See id. at 296–98.
93. DOONAN, supra note 76, at 5, 7.
94. Id. at 3.
95. See Karen Pollitz et al., Early Experience with “New Federalism” in Health
Insurance Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8 (2000).
96. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
ACT (HIPAA) OF 1996 HELPFUL TIPS 6–7, https://go.cms.gov/2Sx9vJn [https://
perma.cc/3ADQ-2ALN] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
97. DOONAN, supra note 76, at 3.
98. Id. at 5.
99. See id. at 82.  While some may argue that the law also lacked sufficient
penalties for states’ non-compliance, such penalties are difficult to enact without
running afoul of laws that prevent the federal government from mandating the
states perform, without providing funding to do so, the so-called “unfunded man-
dates.” See generally PAUL L. POSNER, THE POLITICS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES:
WHITHER FEDERALISM? (Georgetown Univ. Press, 1998).
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3. Cooperative Federalism in Polarized Times: Challenging the
Efficacy of Carrots
Historically, scholars and policymakers alike often assumed
that large financial incentives would induce states to comply with
federal wishes. The current political climate has made scholars
question these assumptions.
In 2010, the ACA was enacted along partisan lines.100  This Act
required states to expand their Medicaid programs to include per-
sons whose income were below 138 percent of the federal poverty
line101 and to remove categorical restrictions requiring that eligible
populations have dependents.  The penalties for non-compliance
were large and included the loss of funding for existing Medicaid
programs—a penalty that the Supreme Court found to be unconsti-
tutional.102  The Supreme Court concluded, however, that states
could choose to expand their Medicaid programs voluntarily under
the ACA.103  Therefore, the federal government had to rely on the
generosity of the ACA’s incentives to induce the states to act.
Prior to the ACA’s enactment, the federal government paid for
anywhere from 50 to 77 percent of the state’s Medicaid costs.104
For the newly eligible Medicaid enrollees (the expansion popula-
tion), the federal government agreed to pay 100 percent of their
costs through 2016, 93 percent until 2020, and then 90 percent after
2020.105  Despite the vast financial incentives, some conservative
states opted not to expand Medicaid,106 arguably choosing ideology
over finances.107  What explains this atypical behavior?  Are carrots
no longer effective in inducing state cooperation?  Is this state be-
havior evidence that theories of cooperative federalism may no
100. See Conlan & Posner, supra note 68, at 289.
101. Previously, federal guidelines for Medicaid eligibility only required
populations under 100 percent of the federal poverty line be covered. See NFIB v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 627 (2012).
102. Id. at 587–88.
103. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 587–88.
104. Robin Rudowitz et al., Medicaid Financing: The Basics, KFF (Mar. 21,
2019), https://bit.ly/3baUFyD [https://perma.cc/TUE9-2HET].
105. Susan L. Hayes, et al., The Fiscal Case for Medicaid Expansion, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 15, 2019), https://bit.ly/2yyAltC [https://perma.cc/
JAK7-FYGC].  While some may argue that poorer states may not have the funds
to cover the ten percent of cost-sharing required, states with particularly limited
budgets have been able to expand Medicaid by cost-shifting from other state
funded programs or increasing state taxes. Id.
106. In 2019, 14 states have not expanded Medicaid. Status of State Medicaid
Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KFF (Jan. 2, 2020), https://bit.ly/2WaTg6A
[https://perma.cc/2978-73E8].
107. See Conlan & Posner, supra note 68, at 289–90.
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longer be useful in explaining current trends in intergovernmental
relationships?
Contemporary partisan politics must be accounted for in order
to more accurately predict state cooperation in the administration
of federal programs.  Ideological considerations appear to moder-
ate the influence of financial incentives on state behavior.108  More-
over, cooperation between the levels of government can seem even
less likely due to the increase in hyper-partisan governors and dif-
fering agendas and priorities between federal, state, and local
governments.109
Rather than abandon theories of cooperative federalism, schol-
ars have addressed partisanship politics by arguing that states are
still cooperating with the federal government but are doing so at
variable speeds.110  Federalism scholars Conlan and Posner have
discovered that states are implementing federal polices “[a]t differ-
ent rates and in different ways in different states[,]” a phenomenon
that they call “variable speed federalism.”111  A form of differenti-
ated federalism, variable speed federalism claims that state behav-
ior is motivated by ideological conflicts between political parties
that control the three levels of government.112  This theory also ac-
counts for geographic variations in politics and priorities, even as
applied to Medicaid expansion uptake.113  To reach these findings,
Conlan and Posner analyzed interviews with state actors responsi-
ble for Medicaid implementation.  These interviews supported vari-
able speed federalism’s accuracy in describing state behavior during
Medicaid expansion.114
108. Philip Rocco et al., Politics at the Cutting Edge: Intergovernmental Policy
Innovation in the Affordable Care Act, 48 PUBLIUS 425, 429 (2018).
109. See Conlan & Posner, supra note 68, at 301.
110. See id. at 299.
111. Id.  The authors suggest that “variable geometry” can also be used to
describe the current state of federalism in the United States. See id. Variable ge-
ometry has been used to describe intergovernmental relationships in the European
Union, where differences between states become institutionalized. See id.  How-
ever, studying the institutionalization of variable state implementation of federal
law is beyond the scope of this Article.
112. See id. at 300.
113. Id. at 281.
114. Id. at 289.  According to Matt Salo, executive director of the National
Association of Medicaid Directors, “[t]here is movement in every state.  They’ll
get there.  Maybe not today and maybe not this year, but they’ll get there soon.”
According to health policy expert Len Nichols, “[t]his is a large and diverse coun-
try, and the people of the different states have different priorities and even val-
ues. . . .  But math eventually trumps ideology, though at different speeds for
different people.” Id.
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In sum, theories of federalism offer varying perspectives on
how intergovernmental responsibilities should be (or are being)
structured to facilitate successful implementation and enforcement
of policies in ways that account for the American system of federal-
ism.  Given the research presented in this Section, cooperative fed-
eralism appears to best describe current federal-state relations.
However, as the comparison of the implementation of CHIP and
HIPPA demonstrate, not all cooperative federalism arrangements
are equally as effective.  To ensure adequate state cooperation in
implementing federal policies, federal policies calling for state en-
forcement must be accompanied by financial incentives, clear fed-
eral standards, federal oversight, and reporting requirements.
Finally, federal expectations of state cooperation must address the
likelihood that states will vary in the speed and approach taken to
implement these federal policies.
In the following Section, I analyze federal-state relations in
health insurance regulation in the United States and in doing so,
apply the theories of federalism reviewed above.  I begin by exam-
ining the statutory divisions of powers to regulate insurance, high-
lighting implications for federalism and providing the context
within which parity was born.
III. FEDERALISM, HEALTH INSURANCE AND PARITY
A. The Marble (and Layer?) Cake of Health Insurance
Regulation
Throughout modern history, there has been a battle between
the federal government and the states over the regulation of health
insurance.  These conflicts have created what I call “federalism fric-
tion,” or disagreements over how powers and responsibilities
should be divided between the federal and state governments.
These disagreements can be long-lasting and are often not easily
forgotten by the parties involved.  Federalism friction has become a
common byproduct of health insurance regulation in the United
States and has only worsened as the federal government has ex-
panded its role in regulating the markets within which groups and
individuals purchase health insurance.115  To better understand how
and why federal parity policy implementation has been affected by
issues of federalism, a brief contextual overview of issues of federal-
ism that have arisen in health insurance regulation is warranted.
115. See Frank & McGuire, supra note 6, at 127–28.
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Historically, private health insurance was regulated by the
states.116  In 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Paul v. Vir-
ginia117 that the issuance of an insurance policy was a contractual
relationship and not a transaction of commerce.118  In doing so, the
Court reinforced the states’ power to regulate insurance and pro-
hibited federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution.119  In 1914, the U.S.
Supreme Court again acknowledged the states’ power to regulate
insurance by holding that the regulation of insurance fell under the
states’ police powers.120  For nearly 75 years, states enjoyed almost
exclusive jurisdiction over health insurance, among other general
liability insurance.121  However, in 1944, confronted with the reality
that insurance transactions increasingly involved the negotiation
and execution of insurance contracts across state lines, the Supreme
Court overruled Paul in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association.122  The Supreme Court held that the sale and issuance
of insurance contracts are acts of commerce.123  Justice Black wrote:
Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the Constitution
so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they
had in the common parlance of the times in which the Constitu-
tion was written. To hold that the word ‘commerce,’ as used in
the Commerce Clause, does not include a business such as insur-
ance would do just that.124
After South Eastern Underwriters, states could no longer main-
tain their exclusive jurisdiction over insurance regulation.  Insurers
feared strict federal regulations.  So, states and insurers lobbied for
federal legislation that would limit federal encroachment on this
traditional state power.125  Congress responded with the 1945 Mc-
116. Kala Ladenheim, Health Insurance in Transition: The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 27 PUBLIUS 33, 34 (1997).  It was not
until the 1930s that the states began regularly exercising their powers to regulate
private health insurance. See Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 17–18.
117. Paul v. Va, 75 U.S. 168 (1969).
118. See id. at 183.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
120. See German All. Ins. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 407–09, 413–14 (1914).
121. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533,
534 (1944).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 553.
124. Id. at 539.
125. See Nicole Huberfield, Federal-State Tensions in Fulfilling the ACA’s
Promises, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2013), https://bit.ly/2tUERjM [https://
perma.cc/23QE-XY5Q].
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 23  3-JUN-20 8:24
2020] MHPAEA & MARBLE CAKE 613
Carran-Ferguson Act,126 which stated that if a federal statute—not
enacted specifically to regulate the business of insurance—indi-
rectly regulated insurance in a way that conflicted with state law,
the state laws governing insurance would supersede the federal
law.127  While this Act reinforced state power to regulate insurance,
it also made clear that when Congress chose to regulate insurance,
federal law would preempt state law.128
It was not until the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in the
1960s that the federal role in health insurance expanded, thereby
setting the stage for greater federal involvement in the regulation of
health insurance.129  In 1974, Congress enacted Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (“ERISA”).  While ERISA was passed
primarily to address the rise of bankrupt pension plans, it also
greatly restricted the ability of states to regulate private-sector em-
ployer and union health benefits (ERISA plans).130  ERISA cre-
ated exclusive federal jurisdiction over self-funded (or self-insured)
employer-provided health benefit plans by defining them as benefit
plans and not insurance.131  Employers fully funded these plans, re-
ceiving premium payments from the employee and then paying the
costs of their medical claims.132  Under ERISA, states maintained
the power to regulate insurance carriers and health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) but were preempted from regulating self-
funded employee-benefit plans (self-insured plans).133  This meant
that self-insured plans did not have to provide benefits mandated
by the state, only those mandated by the federal government.134
ERISA not only regulated self-insured plans but also created
federal minimum standards for all employer-sponsored health
plans, including those where the employer purchased health insur-
ance for the employee from private insurers at a group rate.135  ER-
126. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, 49 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15).
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
128. See id.
129. Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 20.
130. ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://bit.ly/2OGJjKe [https://perma.cc/
W54M-Q4DA] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)–(3) (2018).
132. Self-Insured Plan, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://bit.ly/37cWXLF [https://perma.cc/U2Q4-S3CL] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2).
134. ERISA Plans, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., https://bit.ly/2VnyVcR [https://
perma.cc/DZD5-RBET] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
135. ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 130.  ERISA does not apply
to group health plans provided by governmental entities or churches.
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ISA established a formal grievance process for violations, which is
overseen by the federal government.136
While ERISA provided a federal minimum for some health-
care plans, it also created two layers of oversight and regulation of
private health insurance—one overseen exclusively by the federal
government and the other primarily by the state governments.  In
doing so, ERISA increased the level of complexity for future health
insurance reform, including that of parity.  To truly create a na-
tional standard that applied to all health insurance plans, all states
and the federal government would now need to adopt the same
minimum standards.
ERISA was not without its opponents.  Several states tried to
regain their exclusive jurisdiction over employer-sponsored health
insurance, but neither Congress nor the federal courts heeded their
pleas.137  Moreover, while ERISA may have provided sufficient
minimum standards for some employee benefits, the protections it
offered were not as robust for health insurance and were often less
generous than state laws governing health insurance.138  State lead-
ers expressed frustration with the ERISA preemption because,
rather than creating a federal minimum which states could exceed,
it handicapped state actors and prevented them from enacting
state-wide benefit mandates that would benefit all of the state’s
citizens.139
ERISA has endured, and through the use of the interstate
commerce clause (among other federal powers), the federal govern-
ment has continued to expand its regulation of private health insur-
ance plans.140  However, support for health insurance reform has
met political opposition from conservative factions and has become
embroiled in party politics, resulting in the passage of the ACA
along party lines and state refusal to cooperate in its implementa-
tion.141  The policy history of health insurance regulation presented
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018).  ERISA is administered by the Department of
Labor. See Health Plans and Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://bit.ly/
2OHOLMR [https://perma.cc/9R35-DRX8] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
137. See Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 22.  Employers that operated
in more than one state preferred the exclusive federal regulation because it meant
they only had to comply with one regulator as opposed to trying to meet the regu-
lations of multiple states. See id.
138. See Karl Polzer & Patricia A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections
Under ERISA, HEALTH AFF., 93, 94–95 (1997).
139. See Issues of Federalism, supra note 24, at 22.
140. For a short history of federal expansion into health insurance regulation,
see Sparer et al., supra note 28, at 37–44.
141. Divided States of America: Part 1 (PBS television broadcast Jan. 17,
2017) PBS, https://to.pbs.org/39AjvYe [https://perma.cc/5DY3-PVTX] (last visited
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in this Section, a history wrought with growing federalism friction,
provides context needed to better understand the difficulties faced
by parity advocates in designing health insurance reform that would
increase access to SUD treatment coverage.  The following Section
explores the development of parity and how the previous battles
over issues of federalism have shaped its implementation and
enforcement.
B. Federalism and Parity
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, private health insur-
ance firms have historically refused to cover mental health and
SUD treatment benefits.142  In the past, the primary reasons cited
for excluding mental health benefits and SUD benefits were fear of
moral hazard and fear of adverse selection.143  Moral hazard refers
to the belief that people will overuse a benefit, like healthcare, if
they perceive it to be “free.”144  This theory has been routinely used
by health insurers, and some scholars to justify increased cost-shar-
Feb. 17, 2020); Divided States of America: Part 2 (PBS television broadcast Jan. 18,
2017) PBS, https://to.pbs.org/39AjvYe [https://perma.cc/5DY3-PVTX] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2020).
142. See, e.g., DANIA PALANKER ET AL., NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AT RISK: DEREGULATING THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET
AND THE IMPACT ON MENTAL HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2018), https://bit.ly/
2SDMfcM [https://perma.cc/Y7UN-MESK].
143. Sam Huber, Parity in Mental Health Coverage: Moral Hazard, Adverse
Selection, and the Domenici/Wellstone Act, VIRTUAL MENTOR (2002), https://bit.ly/
2V1w9eC [https://perma.cc/W66C-FJ22].  Presence of a public state system that
covered the costs of SUD treatment are also thought to have contributed to the
lack of private insurance coverage for SUD treatment. See Frank & McGuire,
supra note 6, at 143.
144. N. Gregory Manikw, The Economics of Healthcare, HARV. UNIV.: DEP’T
ECON., 1, 5 (Sept. 26, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://bit.ly/2HFvKGM [https://perma.cc/
8KKX-QXXT].
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ing145 in an effort to control healthcare spending perceived as un-
necessary and wasteful.146
145. For the benefit of readers without a healthcare background, this footnote
defines terms commonly used to describe cost-sharing mechanisms in healthcare
financing. COST-SHARING refers to the share of out-of-pocket expenses borne by
the person insured by the health insurance (the insured). Cost Sharing, U.S. CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://bit.ly/2HALLy1 [https://perma.cc/
R3ZX-UAC7].  These expenses include deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments
but do not include the costs of premiums, costs for using a provider that is not
contracted with the insurer (or “out of network”), or the costs of services that are
not covered by the health insurance plan. Id. PREMIUMS are a set amount paid by
the insured typically monthly. Premium, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://bit.ly/39GKAJk [https://perma.cc/6QHR-WANG].  A DEDUCTIBLE
is the amount that the insured must pay before the health insurer begins to cover
costs. Deductible, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://bit.ly/
38H1U0A [https://perma.cc/CZ4S-RFBX].  Typically, most insurance health insur-
ance plans cover some services before the deductible is paid, and the ACA re-
quires that these pre-deductible services include specified preventative services.
Id. If a family is covered under the same health insurance plan, the plan will likely
have a family deductible, which is less than the combination of each individual
family member’s individual deductible.  For example, the individual’s deductible
may be $1,000, but the family deductible may be $1,800.  In such a case, the de-
ductible can be met in two ways: when an individual incurs $1,000 in expenses, she
has met her deductible; when the total contributed reaches $1,800, the deductible
is met for the entire family.  Health insurance plans often have separate deduct-
ibles for healthcare visits and prescription drug benefits. Id. COINSURANCE is the
percentage of costs the insured pays after the deductible has been met. Coinsur-
ance, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://bit.ly/39SUwzh
[https://perma.cc/9X57-SED6].  So, for example, if the insured has an $1,000 de-
ductible and 20 percent coinsurance, and the insured is hospitalized for an acci-
dent, the insured would pay her $1,000 deductible and 20 percent of the remaining
hospital bill.  Coinsurance costs are paid after the deductible is met but before the
out-of-pocket maximum is reached. Id.  After the OUT-OF-POCKET MAXIMUM
amount has been reached, the insured will no longer be required to pay the coin-
surance amount. Id. Deductibles can be applied to the out-of-pocket maximum;
however, premiums do not count towards the out-of-pocket maximum. Id.
COPAYMENTS similarly do not apply towards the out-of-pocket maximum and
therefore must be paid regardless of whether the out-of-pocket maximum has been
met. Co-payment, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://bit.ly/
32cPevT [https://perma.cc/GKN8-5SJ4].  Copayments (or copays) are fixed
amounts paid for each service, typically paid at the time of the service. Id. The
amount often varies depending on the type of service.  For example, the copay for
a primary care physician may be $20, while the copay for a specialist may be $35.
Copayments are paid after the deductible is met or for some services that are per-
mitted before the deductible is met. Id.  The ACA prohibits insurers from charg-
ing copays or other coinsurance for specified preventative visits. See Preventative
Services Covered by Private Health Plans Under the Affordable Care Act, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://bit.ly/38JD4NI [https://perma.cc/5VQA-
PHBB].  The amounts the insured is expected to pay in co-insurance costs, as well
as out-of-pocket maximums are contractual and differ greatly by plan. Premium,
U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://bit.ly/39GKAJk [https://
perma.cc/6YE3-BVT4].
146. Insured are less likely to utilize services when co-insurance amounts are
higher.  Robert H. Brook et al., RAND HEALTH, THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERI-
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Based on this theory, health insurers suspected that covering
mental health and SUD benefits would encourage patients to utilize
more of these services—even when not medically necessary.147  In-
surers also believed that it would be difficult to objectively deter-
mine which mental health and SUD treatments were medically
necessary.148  Unlike most physical illnesses, mental illnesses and
SUDs do not have blood tests that can be used to diagnose illness,
and the treatments for both mental illness and SUD often vary
drastically by provider.149
Theories of adverse selection were also used to justify exclud-
ing mental health and SUD benefits.150  “Adverse selection” refers
to an increased likelihood that someone with an illness gravitates
toward an insurance plan that offers benefits for that illness.151  For
an insurance plan to be sustainable, the plan’s risk of “loss” must be
MENT 1, https://bit.ly/2SPmrcR [https://perma.cc/HQS8-MJZS] (last visited Feb. 22,
2020) [hereinafter THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT].  The threat of moral
hazard and the need for cost-sharing was popularized by the findings of this study,
which has continued to have significant influence on health insurance scholarship
and policy. Id.  Therefore, plans with higher co-insurance amounts are often
cheaper for insurers to administer, not only because the insured is paying a greater
percentage of the costs of healthcare, but also because the insured uses less health-
care to begin with. Id.  As a result, health insurance plans with higher co-insurance
amounts tend to have lower monthly premium costs. Coinsurance, U.S. CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., https://bit.ly/3bGgcjW [https://perma.cc/
A3BB-4K2Q].  While such plans may be good for everyone’s pocketbook at the
outset, such decreased use may affect the overall health of the insured, particularly
if insured has a low income and poor health. THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERI-
MENT at 3.
147. Dr. Arons Testifies for Inclusion of Mental and Addictive Disorders Ben-
efits, in SAMHSA NEWS 9–10 (Office of Commc’ns, 1993).
148. Graison Dangor, Mental Health Parity is Still an Elusive Goal in U.S.
Insurance Coverage, NPR (June 7, 2009, 5:00 AM), https://n.pr/2SQPTiF [https://
perma.cc/CXD7-SD99].
149. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., MEDICAL NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH
PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS. 14 (2003), https://bit.ly/37tIB9L [https://perma.cc/6JPS-ALQC] (“The
nature of behavioral health care services compared to general physical medical
care is such that there is less ‘objective’ evidence available to guide decisions that
reflect a consensus as to what the appropriate treatments should be for a given
diagnosis.”).  For an explanation of how this issue, in turn, impacts the ability for
those seeking mental health services to be approved for needing treatment, see
NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, A LONG ROAD AHEAD: ACHIEVING TRUE PAR-
ITY IN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE CARE 4–5 (2015), https://bit.ly/
38xBOgt [https://perma.cc/QYE2-2VGB].
150. See Richard G. Frank et. al., Solutions to Adverse Selection in Behavioral
Health Care, HEALTHCARE FIN. REV., 109, 109 (1997).
151. See Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health
and Addiction Insurance Parity, 88 THE MILBANK Q., 404, 412 (2010).
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spread across a large and diverse population, where the healthy can
subsidize the sick; adverse selection threatens this balance.152
While theories of adverse selection and moral hazard have
made private insurers weary of covering SUD treatment benefits,
public payers, including Medicaid and Medicare, have historically
covered mental health and SUD benefits—with Medicaid currently
funding 50 to 70 percent of all mental health and SUD benefits.153
State and local governments have also borne a large responsibility
for the funding of community mental health centers and local psy-
chiatric hospitals.154  And this financial responsibility has, at times,
motivated some state legislatures to enact parity legislation to help
offset state costs.
C. Parity & Its Federalism Implications
The first public conversation about parity occurred in 1961
when President John F. Kennedy ordered “[t]he Civil Service Com-
mission to offer equal insurance coverage for mental health and
‘general medical care.’”155  Eight Congresses later, mental health
parity legislation was introduced but did not pass.156  Building on
the policy ideas presented by the Kennedy administration, state leg-
islatures in the 1970s and 1980s began enacting mandated benefit
laws that required insurers to provide a minimum level of benefits
for alcoholism (38 states), other SUDs (25 states), and mental
health (18 states).157  Mandated benefit laws helped defeat the fears
152. See id.
153. Katharine R. Levit et al., Future Funding for Mental Health and Sub-
stance Use Disorder: Increasing Burdens for the Public Sector, 27 HEALTH AFF.
513, 513 (2008).  Since Medicaid’s founding in 1965, “[m]edicaid rapidly began to
dominate mental health spending.”  Richard G. Frank & Sherry Glied, Changes in
Mental Health Financing Since 1971: Implications for Policymakers and Patients, 25
HEALTH AFF. 601, 604 (2006).  Medicaid and CHIP are currently responsible for
50 to 70 percent of all MHSA expenditures, depending on the state. The Federal
and State Role in Mental Health, MENTAL HEALTH AM., https://bit.ly/2Ssqcpo
[https://perma.cc/23EX-L3R8] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
154. MENTAL HEALTH AM., supra note 155.  Although states receive Mental
Health Block Grants from the federal government in addition to the funding re-
ceived from Medicaid and CHIP, states ultimately have the power to determine
how to fund their state’s mental health services.  Id.  Furthermore, this state fund-
ing is often disseminated further to the counties where services are typically of-
fered on a local level.  Id.
155. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE MENTAL
HEALTH & SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER PARITY TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 3
(2016), https://bit.ly/2W8Z2FP [https://perma.cc/WJC6-NNAR] [hereinafter PAR-
ITY TASK FORCE REPORT].
156. Id. This initial parity legislation addressed coverage for mental health
care, not SUDs. Id.
157. Barry et al., supra note 151, at 408.
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of adverse selection because, if all insurance offered SUD benefits,
insurers would not need to worry about persons affected by SUDs
being attracted to the plans with SUD benefits.  Notably, Connecti-
cut was the first state to implement a “mandated mental health par-
ity law” in 1971.158  Despite these early efforts, most state
legislation did not address parity.159
In the 1990s, the parity narrative re-entered the federal dis-
course when “[c]onsumer advocates pressing for benefit parity at
the state and federal levels began framing the issue more explicitly
as an antidiscrimination measure.”160  The efforts were rewarded
with the enactment of the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996
(“MHPA”).161
While advocates had hoped for a comprehensive parity bill, in
order to get the necessary votes for enactment, the proposed ver-
sion of MHPA only applied to large employer health plans (with 50
or more employees) and included a cost exemption.162  Moreover,
MHPA only required mental health benefits have the same annual
and lifetime dollar limits as physical health benefits but did not ad-
dress other treatment limits,163 ultimately making the mental health
benefits “[l]ess generous than coverage for other health bene-
fits.”164  MHPA’s protections also did not apply to SUD benefits.165
Because of these deficiencies, many advocates viewed MHPA as
primarily a symbolic victory;166 others viewed it as the first step in
incremental policy change.167
The next incremental step in achieving parity occurred in 1999
when the Clinton administration required mental health and SUD
158. Lucas Quass, Federal Efforts to Achieve Mental Health Parity: A Step in
the Right Direction, But Discrimination Remains, 4 LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF 35, 49
(2012).
159. Id.
160. Barry et al., supra note 151, at 409.
161. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-204, § 701,110 Stat. 2944
(1996).
162. Barry et al., supra note 151, at 407.  If an employer could demonstrate
that costs increased by more than two percent during the first year of implementa-
tion and one percent every subsequent year, then they would be exempt from com-
plying with MHPA. Id.; see also The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act (MHPAEA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., go.cms.gov/
2Sr8qmC [https://perma.cc/77EB-HWW7] (last updated Oct. 27, 2016) [hereinafter
CMS, MHPAEA Fact Sheet].
163. Barry et al., supra note 151, at 407.
164. Sarah Goodell, Health Policy Brief: Enforcing Mental Health Parity,
HEALTH AFF. 1, 2 (2015), https://bit.ly/39bP2Qt [https://perma.cc/U5NR-4HAH].
165. Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 479 (2011).
166. Barry et al., supra note 151, at 410.
167. See id. at 416.
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treatment parity for the federal employees health benefit pro-
gram.168  This was a critical point in parity history because it gave
researchers a natural policy experiment with federally collected
data on the actual costs and benefits of mental health parity.  The
analysis on this data resulted in findings that would help quiet con-
cerns about moral hazard.169  Although it took another nine years
after President Clinton’s directive before federal parity would see
another expansion, “top-down” policy diffusion170 occurred—37
state legislatures passed state parity bills between 1996 and 2006.171
These state parity laws varied in their protections, with some limit-
ing their protections to public employees172 and others providing
comprehensive state parity laws requiring parity across both quali-
tative and quantitative treatment limits.173  While some victories
were won at the state level, the disparities between the state regula-
tions lead advocates to again ask the federal government to
intercede.
In 2008, federal policymakers expanded federal parity law with
the passage of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act
of 2008 (“MHPAEA”), which amended ERISA.174  The MHPAEA
not only added SUD benefits, but it also required parity for all fi-
nancial requirements and treatment limits, including out-of-net-
work coverage.175  It prohibited separate cost sharing and treatment
limits.176  Although the MHPAEA extended parity requirements
and added SUD benefits, it did not include a benefit mandate—a
mandate which would have required all large group plans to pro-
vide mental health and SUD benefits.177  MHPAEA only required
that, if a health plan included mental health and SUD benefits,
168. See Goodell, supra note 164, at 2 (addressing cost sharing treatment lim-
its, and number of visits).
169. Id.
170. See Lucie Cerna, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE NA-
TURE OF POLICY CHANGE AND IMPLEMENTATION: A REVIEW OF DIFFERENT THE-
ORETICAL APPROACHES 11 (2013), bit.ly/2OYiod4 [https://perma.cc/84CR-5W7A]
(“Top-down processes mean that policy decisions from the national level are
passed on to lower levels. . . .”).
171. Barry et al., supra note 151, at 410.
172. Id. (explaining how South Carolina’s law only applied to public
employees).
173. Id.
174. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511–12, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)); 45 C.F.R. §§ 146, 147 (2013); see also CMS,
MHPAEA Fact Sheet, supra note 162.
175. CMS, MHPAEA Fact Sheet, supra note 162.
176. Id.
177. See Goodell, supra note 164, at 2.
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those benefits must be at parity with physical health benefits.178  As
such, rather than take on the additional cost that parity was pre-
dicted to create, insurers could simply refuse to offer mental health
and SUD benefits altogether.179  While the lack of a benefit man-
date greatly weakened MHPAEA, its inclusion would have resulted
in increased lobbying efforts against the bill from the business
lobby, which was already weary of the increased costs that parity
could bring.180
Policy entrepreneurs decided to continue with their strategy of
incremental policy change, sensing the opportunity for further par-
ity reform would soon present itself.181  Their patience was re-
warded in 2010 with perhaps the greatest expansion of federal
regulation of health insurance, the ACA.182  Among other provi-
sions, the ACA had a benefit mandate that required all ACA-com-
pliant individual and small group market health insurance plans
(qualified health plans) to provide ten essential health benefits
(“EHB”s).183  Parity advocates negotiated the inclusion of mental
health and SUD benefits as one of these ten EHBs.184  However,
this benefit mandate only applied to individual and small group
178. Megan Douglas et al., Morehouse School of Medicine, Evaluating State
Mental Health and Addiction Parity Statutes: A Technical Report, PROVIDENCE ST.
JOSEPH HEALTH 1, 1 (2018), https://bit.ly/3dmHzQ3 [https://perma.cc/89H7-98VY]
(explaining how insurers must “treat illnesses of the brain, such as depression or
[SUDs], the same way they treat illnesses of the body, such as diabetes or cancer”).
179. The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA),
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 29, 2010), https://go.cms.gov/
3cn5CP4 [https://perma.cc/7XGJ-WLYC] (“The MHPAEA regulation updates the
small employer exemption [and] withdraws the MHPA regulations concerning the
increased cost exemption.”).  Further, the MHPAEA lacked other important re-
quirements, including the requirement that specific disorders will be covered,
while also allowing for an exception to the law for one year if a plan’s cost in-
creases by one percent or more due to parity. See Goodell, supra note 164, at 3.
180. See Barry et al., supra note 151, at 417 (“In the Senate, it had become
increasingly clear to Senators Domenici and Kennedy that the only viable ap-
proach to gaining passage would be to draft a bill that both parity advocates and
long-time industry opponents could support.”).
181. Id. at 418 (“Anticipating the likelihood of health care reform in the event
of a Democratic presidential victory, industry groups also were motivated to come
to a resolution on parity before the 2008 election.  They reasoned that it would be
more difficult to influence the shape of parity legislation if it were incorporated
into the larger, more unpredictable health care reform debate.”).
182. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1, 124
Stat. 119, 119 (2010) (“Quality, affordable healthcare for all Americans.”).
183. State Insurance Mandates and the ACA Essential Benefits Provisions,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://bit.ly/2SD23fO [https://
perma.cc/75DP-Z2M9].
184. See generally DAWES, supra note 181.
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health plans sold in the ACA marketplace185 and did not apply to
ERISA plans.186
Advocates were also able to amend MHPAEA to extend its
parity requirements from covering ERISA plans to also covering all
ACA qualified plans.187  Because of ACA reforms, federal parity
laws covered an additional 48 million people.188
Through the rule-making process, the Obama administration
was able to extend federal parity law protections, so that they pro-
tected a total of 126 million people.189  In 2016, HHS published a
final rule that applied parity to CHIP, Medicaid Alternative Benefit
Plans, and Medicaid Managed Care.190  These rules fell short of re-
quiring all Medicaid plans to provide mental health and SUD bene-
fits at parity with physical health benefits, nor did it address the
Institute of Mental Disease (“IMD”) exclusion.191  Further, the
MHPAEA did not apply to Medicare—public health insurance that
provided coverage for approximately 60 million people in 2018.192
In sum, the number of health insurance plans that were subject to
federal parity requirements increased greatly with the enactment of
the ACA.  Yet, reform fell short of achieving universal parity re-
quirements across all public and private healthcare plans.
185. Goodell, supra note 164, at 2; ERIC GOPLERUD, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., CONSISTENCY OF LARGE EMPLOYER AND GROUP HEALTH PLAN
BENEFITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 3 (2013), https://
bit.ly/2WtMnwi [https://perma.cc/NBM8-W5BR] (“[T]he MHPAEA compliance
will be a required feature of all health insurance plans sold in the individual and
small group markets starting in 2014. . . . [Additionally,] health plans sold in state
health insurance exchanges will be required to comply with federal parity
requirements.”).
186. See Essential Health Benefits Fact Sheet, CIGNA CORP. 1 (2018), https://
bit.ly/2SDMnb8 [https://perma.cc/8FA7-4CVD].
187. See id. at 4.
188.  PARITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 155, at 4.
189. See id. at 3.
190. Id. at 4.
191. See Medicaid Emergency Psychiatric Demonstration Frequently Asked
Questions, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://
bit.ly/2tYMKEY [https://perma.cc/NNS7-JXSY] (indicating that the IMD exclu-
sion prohibits Medicaid from paying for services provided by IMDs to benefi-
ciaries ages 21 to 64).  The IMD exclusion was relaxed in 2018 by the Substance
Use Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Pa-
tients and Communities (“SUPPORT”) Act, which allowed states the option to
use Medicaid funds to pay IMDs for up to 30 days.  SUPPORT for Patients and
Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 5052, 132 Stat. 3894, 3972 (2018).
192. KAISER FAM. FOUND., AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICARE 1 (2019), https://
bit.ly/2OS3vch [https://perma.cc/6FSS-U8XR].  Medicare Improvements for Pa-
tients and Providers Act of 2008 (“MIPPA”), Pub. L. No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494 is
a separate act that does require that copayments cannot be higher for mental
health and SUD treatment than for physical benefits. Id. § 102, 122 Stat. 2498.
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Moreover, the parity victories were accompanied by the politi-
cal baggage of the ACA.  To many Republican legislators, the ACA
became a symbol of the Democratic Party establishment, and as
such, they attacked the ACA with fervor and zeal.193  Republican
members of Congress called for the ACA’s repeal, as Republican
governors publicly fought ACA implementation.  And, this federal-
ism friction affected how the Obama administration chose to struc-
ture the implementation of the federal benefit mandate and federal
parity laws.194
Prior to the ACA, the Department of Labor and the Treasury
Department were responsible for ensuring that ERISA health ben-
efit plans complied with MHPAEA, and CMS was responsible for
ensuring that non-federal governmental health benefit plans com-
plied with MHPAEA.195  After the ACA’s enactment, the Secretary
of HHS was tasked with determining which SUD benefits would be
required by the benefit mandate and which agencies would be
charged with enforcing the requirements.196  Due in part to compet-
ing priorities and short implementation timeline,197 HHS decided,
upon the recommendation of the Institute of Medicine, that states
should “[m]aintain their traditional role in defining the scope of in-
surance benefits”198 and thereby delegated the responsibility of de-
fining the EHB packages, which included the mental health and
SUD mandated benefits, to the states.199  Pursuant to the final rule,
193. See Huberfield, supra note 125.
194. See Goodell, supra note 164, at 6 (“It remains to be seen whether states
and the federal government are able to take on this level of effort.  With states and
[HHS] still busy with ACA implementation and enforcement activities, it is likely
that we will see more cases going to court to enforce patients’ rights under the
MHPAEA, especially if courts continue to give standing to advocacy or member
organizations and grant class-action status.”).
195. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH PARITY
AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 (“MHPAEA”) ENFORCEMENT REPORT 1
(2018), https://go.cms.gov/2SSEONL [https://perma.cc/979M-MFC7].  However,
firms with ERISA self-funded plans that wish to opt-out of compliance with
MHPAEA must submit applications to CMS.
196. 45 C.F.R. §§ 146–147 (2013); see also CMS, MHPAEA Fact Sheet, supra
note 162.
197. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in
Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Fed-
eralism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Feform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (giving examples of federalism
politics in the implementation of the ACA and competing priorities).
198. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Es-
sential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834,
12,843 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Pts. 147, 155, & 156).
199. See id.
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these EHB packages would need to comply with federal parity
laws.200
Advocates had fought long and hard for a federal minimum
standard of parity.  HHS, with the promulgation of one rule, rein-
troduced state level variation in the interpretation of the federal
standard.  Delegation to the states did not end with the definition of
EHB packages.  HHS also named states as the primary enforcers of
federal parity laws for ACA qualified plans.201  In doing so, it did
not allocate financial incentives to encourage state cooperation in
enforcement nor did it develop a system of oversight over state
enforcement.202
HHS expressly cited to federalism and considerations of the
division of powers in issuing this ruling.203  While HHS determined
that reviewing EHB plans for compliance would likely cost the
states some money, it reasoned that the sums would not be substan-
tial,204 and if the states refused to “substantially” enforce the stan-
dards, then HHS would enforce them.205  The marble (and layer)
cake of MHPAEA enforcement responsibilities that resulted from
this decision is depicted in Figure 1.
200. See id. at 12,844 (“For these reasons, we confirm that plans must comply
with the parity standards applicable to mental health and SUD benefits set forth in
45 C.F.R. 146.136 in both the individual and the small group markets in order to
satisfy the requirement to cover EHB.”).
201. See id. (“As the party responsible for enforcement of EHB, it is up to
each state to set criteria for substitution in its state . . .”).
202. See id.
203. See id. at 12,864 (“[W]e believe that this final rule has federalism implica-
tions due to direct effects on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the state and Federal governments relating to determining standards for health
insurance coverage that is offered in the individual and small group markets.”).
204. See id. at 12,844 (“Additionally, because compliance with EHB would
require compliance with the parity standards, states would not have to defray any
costs associated with bringing plans into compliance because any benefits added to
ensure parity would be considered part of the EHB package.”).
205. Id. at 12,864.
Each state would adhere to the federal standards outlined in this final
rule for purposes of determining whether non[-]grandfathered individual
and small group market health insurance coverage includes the EHB
package, or have [HHS] enforce these policies. . . .  In the view of [the
HHS], this final rule does not impose substantial direct costs on state and
local governments.
Id.
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FIGURE 1.
IV. APPLYING THEORIES OF FEDERALISM TO PARITY
ENFORCEMENT
As Figure 1 indicates, the federal parity law enforcement
scheme is complex.  It demonstrates a form of cooperative govern-
ance for some plan types, but one which is segmented and duplica-
tive.  This segmentation is compounded by a division of powers
over other plan types that is akin to models of dual federalism.  The
division of responsibilities has been based on plan type and is
rooted in federal preemption of state regulation of ERISA plans.  It
is a product of past legislative decisions, as opposed to a structure
or scheme created by design.  Complexity and policy history aside,
if we were to compare the federal parity law enforcement scheme
to the theoretical models presented in Section II, which of those
models would it most resemble?
Junior/senior partnership cooperative models best describe the
division of powers in healthcare policy in general,206 but they fall
short of describing the parity enforcement scheme because, as ap-
plied to parity enforcement, the “juniors” (or the states) have a
great degree of autonomy in planning and designing their individual
enforcement structures. HHS allowed states to define the EHB
benefit plans, designated the states as the primary enforcers of fed-
eral parity laws, and granted states complete autonomy in choosing
enforcement mechanisms.207
206. See DOONAN, supra note 76, at 11.
207. See HHS, Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008; Technical Amendment to
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In doing so, HHS structured the division of responsibilities in a
way that was similar to Clark’s208 cooperative federalism models
(discussed in Section II).  HHS even noted that states were best
equipped to enforce parity because of their expertise in insurance
regulation enforcement.209  There are some benefits of such an ar-
rangement; theoretically, they allow states to tailor their policy
processes to meet the needs of their citizens.  They also grant states
freedom and decreases friction between the federal and state
governments.
The key to success when structuring such cooperative arrange-
ments, however, is to balance state autonomy with incentives and
federal oversight.  Without federal oversight and financial incen-
tives, federal parity enforcement will likely suffer a fate similar to
that of HIPAA and result in wide variation in enforcement, as well
as a failure to actualize a national standard.210  This prediction is
further bolstered by models of variable speed federalism.  Variable
speed federalism supports the argument that states would enforce
federal parity laws at varying degrees and in different ways.211  It
also supports the prediction that state governments would try to
shape parity enforcement to fit their ideological goals, thereby les-
sening the prospect of a federal minimum standard for parity.212  At
the writing of this Article, the ACA’s federal parity regulations
have been in effect for six years—enough time to provide us with
data from all 50 states to test these predictions.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
PARITY LAWS
After reviewing state legislation, regulations, and administra-
tive guidance, I was able to identify and categorize each states’ en-
forcement scheme—a systematic, empirical process called content
analysis.  Based on my analysis, I found that states responded to the
federal parity laws in three different ways:  (1) some states enacted
state legislation requiring insurers transacting in the state to follow
federal parity laws along with the state parity laws that may have
existed, (2) some states did not reference the federal standard but
enacted state parity legislation or continued to enforce previously
External Review for Multi-State Plan Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240 (Nov. 13,
2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Pts. 146–47) [hereinafter MHPAEA Final Rules]
208. CLARK, supra note 64.
209. MHPAEA Final Rules, supra note 207.
210. See generally DOONAN, supra note 76.
211. Conlan & Posner, supra note 68, at 281, 283, 287, 298.
212. Id.
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enacted state statutes on parity, and (3) some states explicitly re-
fused to enforce the federal parity laws and did not create a state
equivalent.  Figure 2 depicts these results, with orange representing
states in category (1), purple representing states in category (2), and
blue representing states in category (3).
FIGURE 2.
Notably, although the state of Texas initially refused to enforce
federal parity laws, in 2017, the state legislature enacted parity leg-
islation that referenced the federal standard.213  As the theory of
variable speed federalism predicted, states varied at the speed in
which they engaged in cooperative federalism.  My analysis re-
vealed that only three states have still not adopted some form of
parity law, and only five states have not incorporated the federal
law into state statutes.
Variable speed federalism also predicts that states will vary in
the ways in which they choose to enforce federal parity.  Unfortu-
nately, it was difficult to capture the mechanisms of enforcement
used by the states because most states did not outline the processes
they were using to ensure compliance with federal parity laws in
their governing documents.  After conducting informal phone inter-
views with employees at a few state insurance commissioners’ of-
fices, I confirmed that at least some of these states were relying on
the same processes that they had in place to oversee general insur-
213. Act of Sept. 1, 2017, § 1, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 769 (codified at TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 531.02251, 531.02252 (2019)).
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ance compliance.  These processes relied on consumers to submit
complaints, which would then be investigated.
A few state legislatures and administrative agencies explicitly
addressed how they would enforce the federal parity laws in their
governing documents.  These states varied in the types of enforce-
ment mechanisms used.  The results are presented in the following
table.
Policy Tool Description
State Legislative Oversight Some state legislatures established a
parity task force, or committee, which
reviewed agency reports of parity
enforcement efforts.214
Parity Violation Fines While state causes of action with asso-
ciated penalties exist for the violation
of state insurance laws, some state leg-
islatures created specific monetary
penalties, or fines, for insurers who
violated parity laws.215
Aggressive Investigations In some states, like California and
New York, the state attorney generals’
offices have investigated complaints
and imposed heavy fines on health
insurers that violated parity laws.216
Annual Filings Some state administrative agencies
have created self-compliance work-
sheets and have required the filing of
annual forms demonstrating compli-
ance with federal parity laws.217
These worksheets have also been used
to educate insurers on changes in par-
ity policy.
Market Conduct Reviews In these states, state administrative
agencies periodically conducted market
reviews, which reviewed health plan
coverage and denials of mental health
and SUD benefits.218
214. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/370c.2(b) (2019).
215. See, e.g., 40 PA. STAT. §§ 908-14, -15 (2019).
216. New York and California are said to “lead the way” in parity enforce-
ment.  Mchael Ollove, Despite Laws, Mental Health Still Getting Short Shrift,
STATELINE (May 7, 2015), https://bit.ly/3cr68ev [https://perma.cc/PM3L-3RPM].
217. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT COMPLI-
ANCE FILING (2014), https://bit.ly/2wAbmFd [https://perma.cc/WZ4R-RHMP].
218. See, e.g., Letter from Al Redmer, Comm’r, Maryland Dep’t of Ins. to
Sen. Thomas Middleton (June 30, 2017) (on file with author).
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Efforts to educate consumers aboutConsumer Education
their rights under federal parity laws
and how to file complaints were initi-
ated by state legislatures in some
states and administrative agencies in
other states. These campaigns were
aimed at addressing concerns that
affected individuals were largely una-
ware of their rights under federal par-
ity laws.219
TABLE 1. TYPES OF POLICY TOOLS USED TO ENFORCE FEDERAL
PARITY LAWS
While this list of policy tools is not exhaustive, it provides some
insight as to how states have differed in their enforcement of fed-
eral parity laws.  And, the finding of state variation of enforcement
of federal parity laws has been documented by the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office220 and advocacy groups like the Ken-
nedy Foundation.221
Future empirical research will need to be conducted to deter-
mine the efficacy of these various enforcement mechanisms.  How-
ever, I predict that policy tools involving active monitoring and
investigation of claims by administrative agencies will be more suc-
cessful than those that rely on consumer action.  Persons with a
SUD that are trying to access treatment are likely doing so amidst a
crisis and requiring them to navigate complicated insurance com-
plaint processes if they are denied care is not only objectively inef-
fective, it is cruel.
A. Practical Implications
What implications do the findings of this Article have for the
future of parity enforcement?  Studies commissioned by the federal
agencies responsible for enforcing federal parity laws have found
violations of the federal law,222 and advocacy groups monitoring
219. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/370c.1(h).
220. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-20-150, MENTAL HEALTH
AND SUBSTANCE USE: STATE AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF COMPLIANCE WITH
PARITY REQUIREMENTS VARIES 15–20 (2019), https://bit.ly/2zcJlom [https://
perma.cc/4RUG-MKHT].
221. Douglas et al., supra note 178, at 7–15 (using a Statutory Coding Instru-
ment (“SCI”) to assess state-level mental health parity statutes and observing the
variations between states).
222. See GOPLERUD, supra note 185, at 52; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-12-63, MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE: EMPLOYERS’ INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE MAINTAINED OR ENHANCED SINCE PARITY ACT, BUT EFFECT
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 40  3-JUN-20 8:24
630 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:591
parity compliance have scored states on their parity enforcement
laws, demonstrating the need to rethink the current parity enforce-
ment scheme.223  Even Congress has indicated wavering confidence
in federal parity enforcement by mandating responsible federal
agencies to publish reports that detail enforcement efforts every
two years.224
I reviewed these reports to determine whether federal over-
sight of state enforcement has increased or whether financial incen-
tives have been introduced.  Instead, I found that the federal
agencies view their role in enforcement as (1) investigating parity
violation claims for ERISA plans, (2) issuing guidance in interpret-
ing the federal parity laws, and (3) encouraging policy diffusion of
innovative state policy tools.  For example, the Department of La-
bor has published its own model self-compliance worksheet.225
HHS has reported publishing 44 FAQs226 to help guide the states in
enforcing parity, including an FAQ tailored specifically to the
opioid crisis and parity.227  HHS also created a website that directs
consumers to the proper enforcing authority based on their insur-
ance plan type, as well as other educational material on federal par-
ity laws.228  Further, federal enforcing agencies have investigated
complaints made through their respective reporting channels.  The
Department of Labor has reported investigating over 1,700 claims
and finding 300 violations since 2010.229  Despite the line-by-line,
laundry lists detailing page after page of federal agency actions to
enforce parity, states continue to score low on parity enforcement
report cards created by advocacy groups.  And there is evidence of
continued gaps in enforcement by state governments.230
OF COVERAGE ON ENROLLEES VARIED  69–102 (2011), https://bit.ly/2Wr7Aa0
[https://perma.cc/P778-ETKR]
223. See PARITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 155, at 21–28; see also
Douglas et al. supra note 178, at 2.
224. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 13001, 130 Stat. 1033,
1278–83 (2016).
225. See generally EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SELF-
COMPLIANCE TOOL FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY
ACT (“MHPAEA”) (2018), https://bit.ly/2SFECSO [https://perma.cc/HU8A-
U78Q].
226. PARITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 155, at 4.
227. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACTION PLAN FOR EN-
HANCED ENFORCEMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER
COVERAGE 2 (2018), https://bit.ly/3fx3INN [https://perma.cc/RSE3-C5VY].
228. Mental Health and Addiction Insurance Help, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://bit.ly/2ULqZDr [(last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
229. SECRETARY R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PATHWAY
TO FULL PARITY 7 (2018), https://bit.ly/3b5sK2N [https://perma.cc/M73F-MV2C].
230. See PARITYTRACK, supra note 18.
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Given the information presented in this Article, how can the
current enforcement scheme be improved to make the enforcement
of federal parity laws more likely?  The current parity implementa-
tion scheme is already a cooperative arrangement between federal
and state policy actors—one in which states are not relegated to
technical implementers.  The arrangement takes advantage of the
expertise of state insurance enforcement agencies and allows states
to address state needs.  However, like the HIPPA enforcement
scheme reviewed in Section II.C.2., the federal parity enforcement
scheme lacks at least two primary components:  (1) it lacks federal
funding to help offset the costs of implementing federal law, and (2)
it lacks reporting requirements and active federal oversight.
Financial incentives that support state enforcement of federal
parity laws are necessary to encourage state compliance.  Since
state insurance commissioners are already investigating and enforc-
ing violations of state insurance law, financial incentives for federal
parity enforcement can be framed as a way to offset the state’s fixed
costs and variable costs for proactively monitoring and investigating
potential parity violations.
Financial incentives can be made conditional on the submission
of annual reports detailing state enforcement activities and on the
adoption of best practices.  The mandatory reports will provide fed-
eral agencies with data needed for proper oversight.  Moreover,
state financial incentives should be accompanied by the appropria-
tion of federal funds to HHS earmarked for parity enforcement
oversight.  While such federal oversight may not be needed indefi-
nitely to ensure parity enforcement, it is necessary to ensure the
actualization of a national standard that will serve as the minimum
level of parity acceptable.
Without these needed adjustments, persons with health insur-
ance coverage will continue to report difficulties in accessing SUD
treatment due to inadequate network coverage or denials for treat-
ments improperly deemed as not medically necessary.  While parity
is by no means the only tool or even the primary tool for combating
the nation’s overdose crisis, it is valuable tool and one that, if prop-
erly institutionalized, can have a long-lasting impact on the way that
generations of Americans access necessary care.
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